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This paper considers the possiblc social welfare consequences of replacing a
national currency by a common currency, the ECU, managed by an -at least juridically-
independent European Central Bank. A final replacement of national currencies imposes
upon the national economy a European-wide interest ratelinílation rate, which could affect
social welfare considerably if the EC is not an optimal currency azea. Welfaze gains from
a final replacement of national currencies by the ECU result in the form of lower
transaction and information costs. If the benefits from a common currency exceed the
costs, a replacement of a national cunrency by a common currency is efficient. If it is
efficient a country can be expected to join the common currency azea, if not the country
will want to maintain its national currency. In the empirical part the structural pazameters
of the model are estimated for the EC countries to assess whether currently a replacement
of their national currency by a common currency is efficient or not.
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~ 1. Introduction
The Maastricht treaty envisages the replacing in the EC of national currencies by a
single European currency, the ECU, issued and managed by a European Central Bank
(ECB) from 1997 or 1999 at last onwazds. The ECU was introduced in 1979, with the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, to serve three main purposes: to provide a zone of monetary
stability, to support closer monetary cooperation and to foster economic and monetary
unity in Europe. During the transition phase towards a European Monetary Union the
ECU is likely to become increasingly important as a parallel currency of national
currencies. The 'hazd-ECU' proposal made by the UK Treasury in 1990 advocates
stimulating ECU currency substitution in Europe as a way to achieve a monetary union. In
the past, some countries actively stimulated the use of the ECU, particulazly France and
Italy. Until 1987, on the other hand, a country like Germany forbade its residents to hold
ECU denominated assets.
In its influential study 'One Market, One Money', the European Commission
(1990) assessed the potential benefits of the replacement of national currencies by a
European currency. Direct benefits result from a reduction in transaction - and inlormation
costs tha[ a common currency allows.
Possible costs of a common currency are created if the participating countries do
not fonn an optimal currency area, a point stressed by Canzoneri 8c Rogers (199U).
Whether countries form an optimal currency area depends on the marginal excess burden
of ordinazy taxation: if the marginal costs of ordinary taxation do not differ widely
between the countries involved, the optimal rate of inflation will also lie within a narrow
range, making a common currency more likely to be an efficient device, since the social
benefits of a common currency in a reduction in transaction costs are then likely to exceed
the social costs of a European rate of inflation that differs slightly from a national rate of
inflation that would have been optimal.
The ECU is currently constructed as a basket of the EC currencies. The weights of
the currencies approximate the weights of the national economies in the EC-total and can
be adjusted after negotiations. In foreign exchange markets the market value of the ECU is
determined: the market value of the ECU can differ from its official value but not
systematically since that would imply riskless arbitrage opportuníties. Arbitrage between
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the ECU market interest rate and a basket of equivalent financial assets in the national
currencies will also ensure that ECU interest rates do not deviate from a 'basket' interest
rate, apart from a margin that retlects differences in transaction and information costs.
These transaction and information costs are an important 'raison d'être' of ECU assets.
Apart from the special way that it is constructed, the ECU satisfies already all characteris-
tics of an ordinary currency.
Financial markets in ECl1 dcnominatcd assets' have expanded strongly in the last
decade: currently, an amount of ECU 221 bn ECU-denominated assets is traded in inierna-
tional financial markets, making it the third currency in international bond markets. At
present a full program of monetary and financial instruments, from current deposits to
forward contracts, is offered. The attractiveness of ECU-denominated assets lies in the
offered lowcost means of acquiring an EC-wide currency diversification and the stable
value of the ECU. The ongoing process of monetary, financial and real integration is
likely to have exerted a substantial stimulus to the use and usefulness of ECUs. While the
use of ECU denomination has been almost exclusively concentrated in the financial sphere,
it is also possible to use ECUs in non-financial transactions'. The basket characteristic will
change when the ECU has replaced the national currencies: all countries instead will have
a share in the ECB.
Aim of this paper is to evaluate the most important consequences of replacing a
national currency by a common currency. With the aid of a small EC economy model that
is worked out, the resource- , public finance -, and the social welfare consequences of the
final replacement of the national currencies by a common are currency are studied.
The structure of this paper is as follows : section 2 introduces the basic small
economy macroeconomic model of an EC country that underlies the current analysis.
Social welfarc with a national currency is detcrmined when authorities set the interest rate
~ Allen (1990) gives a good introduction on ECU money - and financial markets.
Z ECU denomination of inter-EC trade did not exceed I"~a at the end of 1989 and is not likely to have
increased dramatically since then. The use of GCU sight deposits, time accounts and savings account is not
yet general in the EC. ECU notes and coins were only issued on special occasions. Consequently, their
collectors value exceeds the face value signiticantly. The effective monopoly of domestic money as a
transactions currency has not been affected by the ECU, untill now. Currently, the EC countries are engaged
in removing the remaining legal and other obstacles to the use of the ECU as legal tender.
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such as to maximize domestic social welfare. Section 3 considers the consequences of a
replacement of a national currency by the ECU, issued and controlled by the ECB.
Monetary policies initiated by this institution will have a major influence on social welfare
of the participating countries. ln section 4 the theoretical model of section 2 and 3 is
evaluateit rnipirically in an attcmpt to shed morc light on the social welfare conseyucnces
of replacing national currencies by a common currency. Section 5 concludes.
2. The husic muclel.
Consider a small open Guropean economy with a national currency. Money demand
is based on the money-in-the-utility function approach and results from the following
intertemporal optimization program that the representative domestic agent is solving:
maX~ m U~ - J{U~C~~ tV~mr~ÍC' - bt C~t U~,Vm~~ ll~~,Vmm 5O ~1~
~o
s.t. w - r~w~ty~-z~-c~-i~m~-h
W` M` } e` F` - m t.Ïwr - Pr - pr p` r r
lim f~e -a` - 0 m~ z 0
,-m
Utility depends on real consumption and the amount of real money balances. All real
variables are in logarithms. c, denotes real consumption of the domestic agent, y, is real
income which is assumed to be given and constant, T, are lump-sum taxes that are imposed
by the fiscal authorities. m, are domestic agents' holdings of domestic real money. Risk
free bonds denominated in domestic currency and in foreign currency are the only
available financial assets. i, is the nominal interest rate on bonds in domestic currency.
Real wealth, w„ consists of real domestic money and net foreign assets, f„ which are
subject to a no-Ponzi game condition that prevents individuals -and the aggregate of
individuals when we aggregate- from a scheme of continuously rolling over an ever
increasing amount of net foreign assets - or f~~reign debt.
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It is convenient to express net tirreign assets in ECUs: e, then is the ECU exchange
rate of domestic currency at time t, i; "' is the nominal ECU interest rate, p, and ~~;"' are the
domestic and the weighted F,C average price level at time t. The rate of time preference is
given by S. r, is the real rate of interest. h are information and transac[ion costs that are
incurred every period from the use of national monies in the EC. These costs are introdu-
ced here as being independent of other variables of the model and form a deadweight
resource loss to the individual and in general to society. The static efficiency gains from a
common currency in the next section result from the disappearance of the informa[ion -
and transaction costs h when national currencies are replaced by a common currency.
Solving the maximization problems of the representative agents yields the following
first-order conditions from which the implicit demand funetions for consumption goods
and domestic money can be derived:
u~ - ~. (3a)
vm - it (3b)
,l - ~l ( S - r~) (3c)
in which 7t. is the co-state variable associated with real consumption. The real economy is
assumed to be in equilibrium over time: the real rate of interest is assumed to be equal to
the rate of time preference. Real consumption and real money balances, furthermore, enter
the utility function in a separable fashion:
r~ - S b't u~m - 0 (4)
Given ihe assumptions in eq. (4) and the Fisher-hypothesis, the inflation rate moves jointly
with the nominal interest rate:
- S t n~ (5)
Assume that relative purchasing power parity and uncovered interest rate parity hold
throughout the analysis': the expected rate of depreciation of the ECU spot rate is equal to
the difference between domestic inflation and the weighted average EC inflation rate -with
} See Lemmen and Eijffinger (1994) tbr EC empirical evidence on these assumptions.
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weights that retlect the ECU weights of the EC currencies-, and is also equal to the
nominal interest rate differential:
e- JL - TC eC - l- l
ecu
t r t t
(6)
in which ~ is the expected rate of depreciation of the ECU spot rate of the small country,
which is equal to the actual rate of depreciation if we assume perfect foresight. Due to the
assumptions of PPP, 111P and perlcct li~resi~ht, equivulence betwcen scttin~ thc rate of
deprecjation as part of active exchange rate management, the rate of interest and the rate
of moncy gruwth vvill hold since all thrce monctary instruments will have the same onc-to-
one impact on the rate of inflation~. In the presence of uncertainty, this equivalence will
break down, as shown by Poole (1970).
Public finance in country i is sul?ject to the usuaf dynamic government budget con-
strain[:
s
gir } Ki( Tir) - Tir - Sir - l irmit
(~)
in whieh g;, are real government expenditures, tc,(.) are tax collection costs, T„ are real
taxes. s;, are real seignorage revenues accruing to the monetary authorities because of their
monopoly in creating domestic (base) money and their ability to set i„5. m;;" is the supply
by the monetary authorities of real domestic money. According to eq.(7) ordinary taxes
have to be adjusted each period to bridge the difference between real government
spending on public goods and tax collection costs and real seinorage revenues.
Tax collection costs x,(r;,) are assumed to be increasing and convex in T;,:
4 Note that constant real interest and real exchange rates do not give an accurate description of macro-
economic reality in the short-run. Varying real interest and exchange rates are considered as important
adjustment devices in the real economy in the short-run. Since our analysis comes down to a steady-state
comparison of social welfare in different monetary policy regimes, our simplifications may not be that
inappropriate.
5 Real seignorage revenues in eq.(7) are defined according to the 'opportunity cost' definition. The
'cash-flow' approach distinguishes two result from two distinct sources : a) passive seignorage which results
from growth of real money balances, m;', and b) active seignorage, a;, m;,', which results from the inFlation
tax on moncy. 'fhese two sources are referred to as passive and active, respectively, since only with respect
to the latter monetary plicymakers are assumed to develop active policies.
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x,'(t„) ~ 0 and x,"(T„) ? 0 with x,(0) - 0. K,"(r„) - 0 implies that the marginal collection
costs are constant. whereas h,"(T„) ~~ 0 implics that mar~ínal tax collection costs increasr
with a highcr Icvel of taxation. Vègh ( 1989) shuws that optimat intcrest rates arc a
constant vir.. an increasing function of government spending when marginal tax collection
costs are a constant viz. an increasing function of ordinary taxes. The tax collection costs
in our model summarize the social costs of ordinary taxation. Regarding the tax collection
costs rc,(r„), wc simply assume [hat thcy arc lincar in taxcs, t,,:
Ki(Sit) - ri Sit
(g)
(3, is equal to the marginal distortion of ordinary taxes, x,'(i;,), and measures the relative
efficiency of the tax systcm: coimtries with high (3,'s are relatively ineffïcient in raising
taxes and conscqucntly raising taxcs in such a country is relatively costly from a wclfare
perspective. Linearity of tax collection costs in eq.(8), implies that mar~inal tax collec[ion
costs are constant: while this assumption is restrictive to some extent, it allows to reduce
computational complexity considerably. The tax collections are important in the remainder
of the analysis since they are the reason why EC-countries are likely to have different
optimal inflation rates: in EC-countries with high marginal tax collection costs, a higher
rate of inflation is optimal than in EC countries where those costs are relatively low. When
EC-countries do not vary much in thc relative marginal costs of operating a tax system,
the countries constitute an optimal currency area. Canzoneri 8c Rogers (1990) cast the
optimal currency aspect of a common currency into a formal model.
The intlation tax, as ordinary taxes, is distortionary since a higher rate of domestic
inflation induccs agcnts to hold lèwer domcstic balances, according to eq.(3b): only when
the domestic nominal interest rate is eyual to zero, households' demand for domestic
money will be satiated. Without any tax collection costs or other social costs from
ordinary taxation the optimal inflation rate would equal the Friedman rule which prescribes
a zero nominal interest rate. If ordinary taxes are distortionary -or with increasing
collection costs- the Friedman rule is not optimal: efticient taxation requires setting
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positive nominal interest rates".
Given our representative agent asstunption, ag~rcl;ation over all individuals of~
cuuntry rrsults in marrorconomic dcmand tiir consumption goods and real money bal~uiccs
in country i. Consider the (~~Ilowing utility fimction in eq.(1):
U`[ - f {cr ei(Yf2 mu)~ye-ardt
J~o
y~,6~ z0 (9)
in which y, rcllccts the optimal amount ol" real money. "['he other utility parameter 0;
wcibhs thc syuarcd dcviatiuns of actual moncy balances from this hypothetical optimum
amount.
Optimal real balances of domestic money result when the marginal utility of
holding real moncy balances, is cyual tu the domestic nominal interest rate. This first-
order-condition can be solved to give m„ as a f~unction of the domestic interest rate i;,:
1.mtr - Y~ - - [ue;
(10)
A lo~o rise in the domestic intcrest ratc induces a decrease in the demand for domestic
money by UOo~o. -1~6; is equal to the ordinary interest rate semi-elasticity of real money
demand. "To ensure positive real money balances, it is assumed that the following
inequality is not violated:
6 Efticient taxation entails the minimi7ation of the discounted social costs of financing an amount of
public expenditures. Efficient taxation requires (a) the eyualization of the marginal excess burden of all
fonrts of taxation in one period (a static optimality condition), (b) the equalization of marginal costs of
ordinary taxation over different periods, a principle that is known as Barro's tax smoothing hypothesis, and
(c) the equali~~tion over time of marginal social costs of inllation taxation. (b) and (c) are dynamic optima-
lity conditions. Lmpirical testing of the implications of optimal taxation principles would amount to testine
whether intlation and ordinary tax rates are cointegrated (static optimality condition) and whether inflation
and ordinary tax rates are random walks (dynamic optimality conditions). The presence of cointegration
indicates that inflation - and ordinary tax rates are set efticiently in[ratemporally, while evidence of random
walks in intlation - and ordinary tax rates, presents evidence fiir tax-smoothing, i.e. in[ertemporally optimal
taxation.
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mir ~ 0 ~ ii, ~ 0iyi
"I~hr prrsrnt valuc uf domcstic sucial wcllàrc is equal to:
Uir - J { yir - T ir - hi - iit mit } v(mir)1
e-a r dt ( 1 2)
ro
National public linancc is subjcct tu thc intcrtcntporal budpct constraint on public lin~uicc,
which is found by integrating eq.(7) w.r.t. timc:
f {gi[ } Ki( Tir)
- Tir ie -ardt - f {iirmi~ }e -ardt
ro ro
(13)
according to which the present value of all future primary tiscal deticits is equal to the
present value of future seignorage revenucs.
Socia! welfare maximizing monelcrry ~~olicies.
The social welfare maximization probfem is solved by maximizing the indirect
social welfare function, which is found by substituting eq.(13) and eq.(9) into eq.(12), with
respect to the domestic nominal interest and ordinary taxes:
z
maxUir y,,,, f {yir-gi:-Ki(Tir)-hi-ei(yi2mir) Íe-ardt
r~
(14)
It is also possible to carry out the welfare maximization program with the rate of domestic
credit growth, Ei,, as the monetary policy instrument instead of the nominal interest rate
because ofthe one-to-one relation behveen both variables in the absence of uncertainty.
From the two Eo.c.'s of the indirect social welfare function in eq.(14), the following static
optimality condition on efticicnt interest rate tart;eting and ordinary taxation results:
- eiKi(Tir)
which indicatcs the need to set a propurtionally higher interest rate in the presence of
(15)
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higher mar~inal distortiuns such as to raise hip,her seip,norage revcnucs. If we; substitutc
eqs.(15). ( 10) and (8) into eq.(14) it is possiblc to determine social welfare of country i at
time t with a national currency, U,;~`, as a function of {h,,~3„B,; for a given dynamic path
of y„ and ~~,,:
,
Nc e~ Ki ~i~~)2(~;r f lyt~ j,'u - K;(zu) {~; . . - }c, -a~dt
J 2
~~
Apart from differences in h, and 0,, thc EC countries are likely to differ in the efticiency
of collecting ordinary taxes. When thesc differences are substantial, the countries cannot be
considered to li~nn an optimal currency arca, a point convincingly stressed by Canzoneri 8c
Rogers (1990).
Assume that thc I:CI I intcrest rate at time t is cyual to its theoretical basket valuc:
eeu
tr - Ir - ~ )`ilir ~ ~ieiKi ~Tit~ - ex~~Lr~
i i
(I7)
in which ~, is the share of EC country i in the value of the ECU. Variables with a bar are
weighted EC averages, with weights ~.,. The wei~hts were adjusted with the Trcaty of
Maastricht in which it was also decidcd that these weights will remain the same till the
ECU has become a common currency. "fhe current weights are:
DM 32.63 PES 4.50
I'FR 19.89 DKR 2.56
PS"I' I I.45 I PT 1.06
DFL 10.23 F.SC 0.71
BFR 8.28 GDR 0.53
ITL 8.18
"I~able 1 Current ECU wci~hts'.
~ DM-Ueutsch Mark, FFR-French Pranc, PST-Pound Sterling, DFL-Dutch Guilder, BFR-6elgian
Franc, ITL-ltalian Lire, PES-Spanish Peseta, DKR-Dansih Krona, IPT-lrish Pound, ESC-Portugese
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~~ 3. Consrqurncc~.c uf cr comrrron rtn~rencv.
Thc (inal step in the process of f?uropean monetary integration of the past decades,
as alrcady indicatcd in lhc intruductiun, consists of a completc rcplaccmcnt of thc currcnt
EC national monies by a common currency, the ECU. A European Central Bank will
control the ECU supply as part of its monctary policies that replace the monetary policies
of the currcnt national Central Banks. 1 lasse (1990) (Chapter 5 and 6) provides an
interesting reading on institutional backl;round of this ECB. Much emphasis in the design
of this ECB will have to be put on its objectives, instruments and its degree of
independence from tiscal policymakers and politicians in general.
Replacing national cun~encies by a common currency clearly has some
consequences even in our simple model. Three important implications that we will
concentrate upon are the effect on real seignorage revenues of country i, the disappearance
of transaction costs when a common currency is available and the effects of the imposition
of EC - wide interest and inflation rates that are not efficient from a national perspective:
the costs of a common currency when the EC is not an actual optimal currency area.
Purpose of this section is to determine under which conditions country i will benefit from
a common currency and under which circumstances it will not. In order to do so we
compare social welfare with national currencies -as considered in the last section- with
social welfare with a common currency in the EC. Social welfare with national currencies
acts as a kind of 'base'-scenario of social wclfare with which social welfare with a
common currency is compared. We cannot expect country i to stick to its commitment of
adopting the common currency if it has no social welfare improvement or even a loss in
social welfare from doing so, as compared to a situation where small country i reneges on
its committnent [o replace its national currency by the common currency. T1ie benef-its
from a common currency materialise in thc model as a permanent savinb h; in rcal
resources cach period, from the disappcarance of former transaction and int~irmation costs".
[{scudo, GI)K (ircck Urachma.
~ A company transacting business in all I:C member States, e.g., will have to buy and sell 12 different
currencies to effect all its transactions. This results in administrative costs, costs from the exposure to
exchange related risks, expenses in the form of commissions and fees, opportunity costs and complicating
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On ihese static ctlicienc} ~ains ihe l~:uropcan C'ommission (1990) notes:
"The udditinn nf u sin~~le currc:ncy tu a sin),~le murket will perfcct the resnurce:
crllnccrtion function njthe price mechuni.t~m cr[ thc level nf the Community us u whole.
Overall transuc~tion cost.c c-crn he conservcrlively ~slimuted to umvun! to 1~2r of GDP
(ECU 13 to 19 hilllun per yeur) for the ('nmmuniry us cr whole, which i.t to be compured
lu Ihe !~4`r uf GDP cs~timuted in the ('ecchini rcport Jirr bnrder cos~ls fbr thc circululinn of
gnods. "
npart I~rom ihcsc static cl~licirncy ~,ains, a common currcncy is likcly to producc
dynamic cfticicncy gains in thc liirm of a highcr growih rate of output. 'I'hese dynamic
efficiency gains, though very interesting, lie outside the scope of the current analysis,
which assumcs constant output fi~r simplicity. lt would be interestinl; to analyse the
dynamic efticiency gains of a common currency in the ti'amework of the New Growth
Theory. A common currency in this framework could give rise to an endogenous growth
process. A common currency in the EC will possibly also give rise to 'external' benefits
-benefits in extra-EC trade and finance- besides 'internal benefits'. The European
Commission notes in this respect:
"First, [he ECU wuuld hecome one of the mujnr world currcncies ulong,side the
dollar und the yen, and could acquirc u vehicu(ur role in trade crnd,finunce fbr EC
residents as well u.t~ nonresidenLe. Thic cnuld hrin,~~ udditional suvin~~a~ on [ransuction cos7s,
yield some revenues from internutionul seiKnoru~~c, und impuct on mucroeconomic
stubility. Second, !he C'nmmunity wnuld he crble to enguge more eJJectively in internutinncrl
policy covrdination und to speuk wilh u sin,~le voice in internationul monetury uj~uir.t-. "
Sei~norage rcvenues of the ËCB, s;', are defined as:
ec ecu ec ecu ec ecu 1 ecu 1
Sr - !r mr - lr ~ mir - tr ~ (Yi - - tr I; ; e;
in which nr„" is the demand for real ECUs in country i which replaces the national
pricing policics, cash and currency managemenl.
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currencv. m," is thc aggregated real ECU muney demand; Sardelis ( 1993) refers to m,`'` as
the Europcan Munetary Agrregate ( I~:MA) and discusses how F.MA targcting policics of
the ECB can he implemented in thr transition phase towards a common currency and aftcr
the introductiun of the common currency. Crucial in the implementation of EMA targeting
policies is thc prescnce of a stable relationship between the EMA and the ultimate targets
of inflation and output. Estimation of an EC aggregate money demand function has been
undertaken, c.g. hy Kremers and Lane ( 1991)): substantial evidcnce is presented that the
EMA displays -both in the short- and long run- a higher degree of stability and
predictability than the national money demand functions and they consequently assert that
the ECB in principle could implement more effective monetary control than could be
achieved independently by the individual national central banks.
As a consequence of its ob,jective of targeting the EMA, the ECB effectively starts
[o function as an EC wide redistributing device of~ seignorage revenues: each country is
entitled to recieve its share, ~.;,`' of ECB seignorage revenues. Only in the case where thc y;
and A, of countries are relatively equal, no scignorage redistribution would occur. ECU
seignorage revenues from residents of country i are simply tansferred back to the monetary
authorities of country i. The intertemporal government budget constraint with a common
currency changesinto:
f ~it } Ki(Tit~
ta
-8tCÍ1 - f {a,istec}e-btCfi
.tlo
(19)
Ordinary taxes have to be changed i~rom r„ to i'„ permanently if real seignoragc revenues
of country i changc as a consequence of a common currency. The change in net real
seignorage revenues of country i, as a consequence of the replacement of its national
currency by a comtnon currency, is equal to:
y The statutes of the European Central Bank determine that the shares in the ECB and therefore the
shares of the seignorage revenues, ~;, from a common currency issued by the ECB will be the average of
GDP and population weights in the EC aggregate GDP and population. These weights differ from the current




Si! -S~~ - a.iS, - i~lrii~- -~t~~ - t~~) (20)
in which 7~,.~,`"` is the real seignorage share of country i in real seignorage revenues of the
ECB. If the expression in eq.(20) is negative a rise in ordinary taxation from t„ to t'„ is
necessary to compensa[e for the drop in real scignorage revenues of country i. The
increase in ordinary taxation will be costly in countries with high ineliicicncies in their lax
system. 'I he sucial costs f~rom thc raisc in urdinary taxes beeause of thc disappearance ul"
seignorage revenues from a national currency, are equal to:
Ki~tit tit) - r i~tit-ti~) - Ki~Sit-Si~) - ~i~Sit Sit)
(21)




Note that the transaction - and information costs h, have disappeared with a common
currency. Usin~ eqs.(9), (17)-(19) eq.(22) can be written as:
cc - - ex'~ti) -- - B~K'~t~)~ a: (23)~ti - f{y;t-g;,-Kt~t~r)-~;~ ex~~tr)cY;- e)-ex~~ti)Y; t 28 1e- dt
Social welfare in the case of a common currency can be compared with social welfare
without a common currency as analysed in the preceeding section. The replacement of
national currencies has utility effects, public tinance effects and resoure effects. In
comparing social welfare with a common currency with social welfare with national
currencies, these effects are taken into account in a consistent manner:
CC NC er ecu ecu ecu
U~~ - U~, - { ~t~ - K~~tit tit) }~iSt - 1~ Ilii~ f v(mi,
- mi~) ÍC -bcd2
r~
(24)
111ree ef~tccts determinc thc chanbc in social welfare in country i trom a replacement ot"
national currencies by a common currency: a static efticiency effect results trom lower
transac[ion costs with a common currency, public finance consequences result from a
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change in seignorage revenues - this effect is captured by the second term in eq.(24)-,
utility effects result from different real money balances with a national and a common
currency - these utility effects are represented by the third and fourth term in eq.(24)-. With
the aid of eqs.(21), ( 18), (17), (9) and (8), we can rewrite eq.(24) into:
Ucc U~NC - f (h~}(R~}t)~~~(eR(Y;-eR)tB;R,(R;-Y;} 1) téá(eR - Y;)}e ardt; 8; 2 2 e;~o
According to eq.(25) the social wclfarc chan~r of a replacement in country i of its national
currency by a common currency, depcnds on (h,,~,,,y;,0„0,(3;,(3}. [n the next section we
evaluate empirically the net social welfare change of eq.(25) of replacing a national
currency by a common currency for the individual EC countries.
yti' -1. Emprricul inve.~~ligulion uJ socrul ~1~elfi~re cnnseyucnces of u common currency.
'I'hc thcurctical analysis resultcd in an cxpression that mcasured thc social wcllàrc
change from a removal of national currencics hy a common currency. Purpose of this
section is to evaluate this expression for the l I EC countries to assess the individual
effects. [t is possible to obtain estimates of the structural parameters y, and 0, in eq.(10)
across the EC. In order to do so an error-correction form of a generalization of eq.( ] 0),
~~.- Y.-rl. tm;r i i ir u
(26)
is estimated, in which m„ is the natural logarithm of real non-interest bearing money (Ml),
i„ the short term nominal interest ratc in country i. rl;' is the long term semi-interest
elasticity of real money demand and equal to 110; Data were available from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators and Quarterly National Accounts. A sample running from
January 1984 till December 1992 was constructed: quarterly data were gathered for all EC
countries.
Estimation of eq.(2O results in estimates of ,y,,0,} of each country. The error-
correction method proceeds in 2 steps: tirst the 'static' money demand function, eq.(26) is
IS
estimated. Stationarity of the errors s„ means by definition that cointegration between the
non-stationary variables is present. In the second stage, a'dynamic equation' for the tirst
difFerence of thr dependent variable is estimated. Included in the dynamic equation
includes is the lagged disturbance errnr from thc iirst stage estimation of the static
equation, the s.c. 'error-correction' term:
sr
i 0~~~ }
The error-corection term p,E,,.,-if signiticant at least- measures by how much real money
demand in each period is adjusted towards its steady state: a value of p, of 0.4 e.g. implies
that 40a~o of the adjustment is made within one period of observation. -rl;" is the short term
semi-interest elasticity of real money demand. "I"he estimation results of these dynamic and
static equation of the 11 EC countries are summarized in table 2"':
~o [3elgium includes Luxemburg.
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The test statistic DF forms a Dickey-Fuller test on stationarity of the error terni in
the static equation, eq.(26), a prerequisite for error-correction estimation to be meaningful.
In all cases, except for Ireland the error term is found to be stationary. Since stationarity
of thc crrur tcrm in thc case of Ircland was only marginally rcjcctcd, thc crror-corrcction
estimaliun was also undertakrn in thc casr uf Ircl~uul. I:ys.(26) and (27) are a special case
of a general money demand function which has real income and the nominal interest rate
as its arguments:
Ir h..
mt~ - at yii -~l i lir } Eir
(28)
in which y„ is the natural logaritm of real GDP of country i. a;' is the long term semi-
income elasticity o1~ real money demand. rl,'' and e„ are in this case marked with a star to
indicate that they in principal will differ as compared to eq.(26). Eqs.(26)-(27) represent a
situation with constancy of output, an assumption that was maintained thoughout our
theoretical part. The dynamic equation from ey.(28) is given by:
~m~~ - a;`Dyt~-~~`~Di~~tp~Eir-i}uu (29)
Eys.(28) and (29) were also estimated to check whether the constancy of output
assumption induces a severe misspecitication because of an omitted variable bias that
could be induced. The estimation results on the static form, eq.(28), and the dynamic form,
eq.(29), are found in table 3. No a[tempt was made to estimate the EMA demand function
because it was preferred to adhere to its theoretical definition as introduced around eq.(18).
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The estimated semi-elasticities have the expected sign in most cases and are more
or less consistent with other empirical studies (Fase 8z Winder ( 1993)). Comparison of the
paramcter estimates of eq.(26) and eq.(28) shows that [he estimates of rl, are not severly
affected when estimating eq.(26) instead of eq.(28). With the aid of these estimates of 0,
and y, it is possible to evaluate eq.(25) and to determine when a country is likely to
benefit from a common currency and when not. ' One Market, One Money' reviews in its
Chapter 10 the potcntial costs and benetits for the EC-couniries qualitatively, but does noi
give any quantitative estimates of the saving in transaction costs for each EC country
seperately. " I~he estimate of O.So~o of GDP of h, is taken as a starting value in the remainder
of the analysis. Assume that avcrage national interest rates will satisfy eq.(15): if we know
0; and fill in the average interest rate we can calculate the initial marbinal distortion from
ordinary taxation, x;'(i;,), which IS tI11S C1SP, CqL1aI t0 ~3;. In eq.(2l) we had already
determined thc necessary change in ordinary taxes, ( T~„ - T„).
Table 4 calculates the social welfarc changes when national monies are replaced by
a common currency in country i, according to eq.(25). Rows 1-3 give the parameter values
that have been estimatedlgiven. 'rhe natural logarithm of real GDP at the end of 1992 is
given in row 4. The marginal distorsion of ordinary taxation is calculated in row 7 using
eq.(15) and average nominal interest rates over the sample period. The instantaneous
change in social welfare is given in row 8 by U,``-(l,"`, in row 9 it is expressed as a
fraction of real GDP. The integral in eq.(25) can be approximated by dividing the
instantaneous social welfare change by the rate of time preference ( set at 0.05 e.t;.), if' it is
assumed that the parameters would remain approximately constant after the monetary
reform since then the expression that is integrated tiirms a geometric sum.
h,"" in row 10 is that value of h, that would make country i indifferent between
having its national currency or a common currency. If this critical h;"" is higher it becomes
less likely that country i will move to a common currency. These critical h;"" could also
indicate a kind of bargaining position. A country with a high h,"" is likely to be in a
stronger bargaining position with rcgard to the division of shares in the LCB than a
country with a low h,"": countries with a h; "' less than O.So~o would benetit if the benefits
of a common currency would be less than 0.5"~o but larger than h,"", while countries with a
h; "' larger than 0.5`~o still would loose iF the benetits would be higher than O.So~o but
lower than h; ~"'.
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Table 4 Social welfare consequences of a common cunency.
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~~he table indicates that for the model parameter values estimatedlchosen, the
expression in brackets in eq.(25) has a positive value for France, Germany, the
Netherlands and the UK while a negative outcome results for the other countries. lt is not
surprising that the net effect is positivc in the case of France, Germany, the Netherlands
and the l1K hccausc uf their rclative hi~h share in ECB seígnorage. The seignorage
redistribution cffects from a removal of national currency -and to a lesser extent the
resource effects- dominate the net social welfare effect of eq.(24): the utility effects are
relatively small. These vutcomes raise doubt whether the smaller southern EC countries
will stick to their commitment to replace their national currency by the ECU, as it could
possibly lead to a reduction in their social welfàre.
Clearly the potential benetits from a common currency, h;, in our model will be
very uncertain in reality and it is no[ pretended that tixing them at O.So~a of GDP is an
accurate procedure. It is thcrefore interestinb to look at the social welfare changes with
difi~erent values ol~ h,. I~igure 1 determirtcs the social welfare chanbe from a common
currency for different values of h; in the case of Italy, a country that will suffer from
introducing a common according to our predictions, and in the case of Germany that will
benefit from a common currency.
Figure l. Italian and German social welfare
effects as a function of h;.
?2
The figure illustrates the relative importance of the benefits from a common currency on
social welfare. The comparison between Italy and Germany indicates the substantial intra-
EC ditTerences that are possihle in thc relative cftècts of a removal of national currcncies
hy a common currrncy, mainly caused by the suhstantial seignoragc redistribution that this
munctary rcli~rm cntails.
In table 5 the calculations of table 4 are repeated except that different weights, ~,',
havc hccn uticd: namcly hascd on thc proposccl rulc on thc division of I;CI3 shares uf 0.5
times of GDl' il country i plus 0.5 times thc population of country i. These weibhts differ
to a certain degree from the current ECU weights and therefore the social welfare
consequences of a common currency are also different: countries with a higher weight in
table 4 than in table 5 experience, not surprisingly, some decrease in their gain or loss
from a common currency when comparing both tables, while countries with a smaller
share in table 4 than in table 5 improve their results when moving from table 4 to 5. In all
cases -except for the Netherlands which now ~xperience a small social welfare loss trom a
common currency- the sign of the net effect is the same but the exact magnitudes of the
effects by using these weights instead those of table 4 differ to some extent.
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Table ~ Social ~~elfare consequences of a common currenc~ ~~íth different weights.
~4
~~5. C'onclt~.cinns
ln this papcr an attempt was madc to evaluate the possible social welfare conse-
qucnces uf thc replacemcnt ol~ national currcncics by a common currency, the t~CU,
managed by a Luropean Central Bank. A small EC-economy model was set up in which
the conseyuences, in the form of static efficiency gains, seignorage redistribution and pure
utility effects, vf the final replacement by a common currency were analysed.
An import consequence of a common currency, is the partial loss of fiscal policy
autonomy: with a common currency participating countries adopt a common rate vf
inflation which is likely to be nvn-efticient when ivoking at the individual marginal
distorsivns from ordinary taxation. The induced changes in seignorage revenues have to be
compensated by opposite and equal chanl;es in vrdinary taxes which may be costly in
countries with a relatively high marginal distorsivn from ordinary taxes.
I~he calculated social welfare changcs Irom a removal of national currencies by a
common currency according to the model were evaluated empirically for the different EC-
countries. ~~he empirical evaluation of the social welfare change from replacing a national
currency by a common currency, indicated that under present conditions a removal of
national currencies by a cvmmon currency possibly causes non-negligible social welfare
changes across the EC. The calculations indicated that the induced static efficiency ef~fects
and the public finance etfects of a common currency dominated the pure utility efects.
Doubt was raised with regard to the question whether all countries will actually stick to
their commitment of a common currency.
The calculations furthermore indicated that the social welfare change from
replacinb nativnal currencies by a common currency depends strongly vn the initial
situation in which such a monetary reform is implemented and on the amvunt of benefits
of a common currency. On these benetits a hi~h degree of uncertainty remains and further
theoretical and empirical research is hi~hly nceded. Besides of the 'static' efticiency gains,
'dynamic efficiency ~ains' trom a common currency are likely to arise. Attcntion was paid
to the effects of different shares in the European Central Bank seignorage.
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